The signalling protocol vulnerability opens DDoS problem in Mobile WiMAX networks. This letter proposes an authentication method that uses the unrevealed upper 64 bits of Cipher-based MAC as a solution. It runs for MSs in idle mode and reduces the calculation complexity by 59% under DDoS attack while incurring 1% overhead under normal condition.
Introduction
Wireless broadband technologies like Mobile WiMAX (MWiMAX) attract more attackers to the wireless area because they carry m-commerce services like banking, shopping, and stock trading. Even better for attackers is that mobile terminals have low processing power making them easy targets. Then what we need is to pin out vulnerabilities in wireless broadband environments and propose the solutions. In this letter, we consider a possible DDoS attack exploiting a vulnerability in the signalling protocol in M-WiMAX and propose a simple solution.
M-WiMAX & Shared Authentication Information

M-WiMAX Network Reference Model
A M-WiMAX network is a broadband wireless network based on the IEEE 802.16e standard which provides the wireless last mile access to fixed, pedestrian, or mobile users in Metropolitan area to replace the wired last mile access such as xDSL, ISDN, CATV, etc. The M-WiMAX Network Reference Model consists of Access Service Network (ASN) and Connectivity Service Network (CSN) as shown in Fig. 1 . The ASN formed by Base Station (BS) and ASN Gateway (ASN GW) offers the radio access to a Mobile Subscriber (MS) and the CSN provides IP connectivity service to the MS. ASN GW is placed at the boundary of ASN and connects BSs to CSN. In this letter, we refer to ASN GW Figure 2 shows the CMAC calculation result. Thus both sides knows total 128 bits of CMAC only half of which are transmitted over the air. The most sig- 
DDoS & MS Authentication
Signalling Protocol Vulnerability
An MS maintains the quality of wireless link through ranging in M-WiMAX. A BS allocates the ranging interval and the MS chooses an appropriate ranging code and transmits it during this interval to obtain the bandwidth for ranging. On successful reception, the BS assigns bandwidth to the MS. As there is no authentication or authorization in this procedure, any MS can request and be assigned the bandwidth for ranging. This gives a possibility of DDoS attack to BS and ASN GW.
DDoS Attack & Authentication of MS in Idle Mode
When an MS in idle mode updates a location, the BS can assure the integrity of RNG-REQ by the CMAC in the message. Since the BS doesn't track the change of the idle mode MS, it requests the ASN GW AK context for the MS. The ASN GW generates and sends the AK context to the BS. Then the BS verifies the CMAC by using this AK context. If the CMAC is not intact, the RNG-REQ is ignored. In this procedure, AK context generation and CMAC verification should not be executed if MSs are not registered. This is because the unregistered MSs can not generate correct CMAC. Otherwise malicious MSs can send numerous RNG-REQs exploiting the signalling protocol vulnerability, which incurs DDoS attack to BS and ASN GW. So we propose a simple defense mechanism authenticating an MS by using SAI that runs before CMAC verification for RNG-REQ. Otherwise it aborts these procedures. SAI update should be performed for next LU when MS authentication is successful since the SAI is submitted to the PC in clear text form in the RNG-REQ. The unrevealed part of the CMAC calculated over the RNG-RSP is used as new SAI and the BS informs the PC of the new SAI by using LU confirm message. Figure 3 shows the procedures of sharing, verifying, and updating SAI. If MS authentication with SAI is not used, AK context generation and CMAC verification are executed for each RNG-REQ, so DDoS attack on BS and ASN GW is possible.
In next section, we analyze the load of AK context generation and CMAC verification as well as the burden of MS authentication, and compare these in terms of processing overhead and delay to show the effectiveness of using SAI.
Simulation Results & Conclusion
Simulation Results
We modified the standard C-implementation of AES128-CMAC algorithm and dot16KDF function to apply SAI [3]- [5] . We measure the number of CPU cycles required for CMAC value calculation, AK context generation, and SAI verification using the rdtsc instruction. The number of CPU cycles is averaged over 1000 simulation runs. For delay analysis, we measure queueing delay in the buffer using the rdtsc instruction and calculate transmission delay on 100 Mbps backhaul link. When calculating transmission delay, we also count UDP-IP-Ethernet header. Table 1 and Table 2 summarizes the simulation environments and results, respectively.
While CMAC calculation and AK context generation require 20116 and 106423 cycles respectively, SAI verification requires only 8 cycles that are for comparing two SAIs -stored and submitted. The advantage of using SAI is in network resilience under DDoS attack.
Analysis of Processing Overhead and Delay
We calculate the total processing overhead without SAI and with SAI. Without SAI, the overhead consists of CMAC calc., LU REQ/RSP trans., AK context gen., and Queueing. With SAI, CMAC calc. and AK context gen. are eliminated under DDoS attack, but additional SAI verification is executed under normal operation. Table 3 shows that the total overhead of 1% increase under normal operation and 59% decrease under DDoS attack.
We calculated the CPU cycles required for each operation to observe the delay reduction by using SAI. With the distance between BS and ASN GW, the portion of reducible delay (AK context gen. + CMAC calc.) decreases since the propagation delay dominates. Figure 4 shows the result. 
